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A maze of responsibility

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to deconstruct, formally decode the notion of responsibility frequently appearing in the process of deinstitutionalisation and long-term care provision. It is a Kafkian predicative category of subordination. Its value is determined by its two objects. "For what" we are responsible constitutes the substance of responsibility, "to what" constitutes its form and sense. By examining the substance of responsibility—for acts, things and people, we have derived the basic parameters, conditions constitutive of responsibility: loss (negative consequences), alienation, reification, removal of will and ascribing. Investigating the form of responsibility, of that to which we are responsible, we have schematically divided instances of responsibility into hierarchic and horizontal, as well as into reflexive and transient. Intricacies of responsibility to authorities, public, community as well as to near ones and the self are explored in their action and contemplative properties. Deinstitutionalisation on the one hand restores civic responsibility to the service users, on the other it transmutes its very conditions. The imperative is to restore their will capacity, not to ascribe acts to stigma, allow reappropriation and humanisation and to put the emphasis on achievement and success. In the case of the key worker, we demonstrate a new pattern of professional responsibility, in which acts are actors' responsibility, while helpers are responsible for service delivery, their own acts and for teamwork that will uphold the user's emancipation. In the transition to community, subordinative responsibility is being transformed into everyday responsiveness and common responsibility for humanity.

Keywords: responsibility, deinstitutionalisation, keyworker, guardianship, responsiveness

1. An institutional keyword

Responsibility is an important issue (often a "hot topic") in any formal organisation. The term is also an important currency in everyday exchanges. Usually as an act of reprimand, turning the other's attention to her or his obligations, duties. In care organisations or institutions this topicality is yet more important, since there is an implication of at least some sort of guardianship over users, residents. This preoccupation is even more pronounced in institutions for people with intellectual disabilities. It is an utterance at the end of any meaningful discussion. It is a key that opens (or rather, locks) many doors.

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The greater importance of this concern in such institutions, compared with other facilities, we can attribute to three clusters of momenta—the *label and career* of the residents, the concern of the *pedagogical* profession and to the commitment of *relatives*. The residents of such institutions acquire their deviant label at a very tender age. Contrary to people labelled with "mental illness", whose lives are being turned upside down later in their life, often by a dramatic life event, the career of residents with the label of intellectual disability begins in childhood, mainly by recognition of the deviation from normalcy. This in itself is a rupture, a life event, however, more of parents and not as a cause of the career but its initial dramatic effect. The guardianship in the parents' career is usually not installed as a denial of legal capacity but as a prolongation of parenting.

Some of these institutions were initially set up for children and only later started to "host" adults. Although children are now a minority in such institutions, the legacy of pedagogical orientation remains. The pedagogical, special education or "defectological" (as termed until recently) model is akin to the medical one in the presumption that the profession knows better what "pupils" must achieve, and how they must behave; what is right and what is wrong. This patronising stance is prominent in the pedagogic subspecies of the "medical model" (it is about the kids!).

The affinity of the two models is genealogical, functional and institutional. In Slovenia, psychiatry was actively involved in the establishing of "defectology". Dr. Marjan Boršnar was the founder of the first such institution (in Dornava), as well as an initiator of "defectology" studies at the level of higher education (Kostnapfel, 1996). In both medical and general educational models, the treatment of people is funnelled according to pre-set values, and deviations from them. If a "pupil" or a "patient" does not attain set norms, the fault is theirs. The *fault*, a deficit is precisely what joins the two models into essentially one. While pedagogy defines what a person needs to know, medicine classifies the person's (biological, psychosocial) incapacity to do so. The social model, on the other hand, places the emphasis on *social* barriers, which disable the person—in attaining his or her goals. Perhaps even more importantly, it stresses that it is the person who articulates the goals, not some superior agency.

In the institutional reality the difference between the two models is almost negligible since such facilities function as total institutions. The noticeable difference is that some wards are run by nurses, some by educators. In other words, while special educational facilities have established a limited autonomy towards medicine, in the sense of modelling the life in them, they have remained the same. The school model is as institutional as the hospital one. Differences are in the nuances, as for instance the source and quantity of funding.

Artificially prolonged childhood and its concordant pedagogic set, amplify the presence of the parents and relatives. In comparison with other (mental health, correctional) facilities where the residents are often "written off" by their kin, in the institutions for intellectual disability the parents are more likely to be engaged and committed to the wellbeing of their offspring. The label of behavioural or mental disorders often implies (prejudices) a "dysfunctional family", whereas the label of intellectual disability, diagnosis frequently (and more potently) confirms the organic nature, thus relieving the parents of guilt. Regardless of the validity of such an assumption, it affects the attitude and interaction patterns of staff in exchanges with family members. In the educational facilities the staff are conversely more prone to be attentive to what relatives have to say and are more ready to cooperate with them. However, there seems to be a "class" difference between the types of institutions. Special care institutions seem to be more receptive to people of an uneducated family

background, who are without any meaningful social power, they are depots where people who have lost their place in the society are parked. Educational facilities ("training centres"), on the other hand seem to be more in use for those who have more social power, more esteem (and they do not want to lose it by not caring for their children). The division of responsibility between the institution and relatives is more akin to the one in schools, where teachers are responsible for that part of a child's life which it spends in the school, and parents are responsible for the part outside the school. In such an arrangement there is more opportunity for both—of relegating the responsibility (a moral "ping-pong") and for cooperation. Regardless of whether it is about connecting or dividing, this kind of dynamic raises the value of *responsibility*.[1]

1.1. How to deconstruct responsibility

The best way of deconstruction of the notion of responsibility is by actively testing (and contesting) it in the reality—to empower residents or users to resume their responsibility in civil way and to make it more a personal, interactive item rather than an institutional issue. However, at some point, such a simple negation does not suffice. We need to see what are the multiple meanings of the term originating beyond the interaction at hand.

In this paper, we seek to deconstruct the notion of responsibility, which springs out so potently in total institutions and in the interactions governed by medical and educational models. We will do this primarily by a formal conceptual analysis. We will decode the notion of responsibly, firstly by exploring its lexical, dictionary meaning. From this, we shall derive its syntactic potential and its ramifications. Although it must be maintained that syntax of words (language and speech) differs essentially from syntax of deeds, on the level of formal analysis, this does not appear to be an issue, since we will examine the virtual properties of the responsibility, not the actual doings. These are more of a linguistic nature rather than of the registry of the actual doing. The revealed syntactic structure will enable exploration diverse formal semantic determinants of the term. It will uncover the problematic knots of the conceptual mesh spreading from the very term. From these we will decode the *conditions of responsibility*, as well as the structure of *instances of responsibility*, their placement in the various sets of such structure, their hierarchic or horizontal relations and reflexive or transient properties, thus decoding the seemingly reflexive nature of the term. The conditions provide the substance of the term, the position in the mesh of relationships its form and its sense.

In the second part—perhaps with too hastily, without rounding up properly the discussion of the term itself—we examine the transformation of the notion of responsibility in the frame of deinstitutionalisation. There, the responsibility has to be negated as a form of subordination, yet affirmed as an expression of emancipation. We topple derived conditions of responsibility, by double negation we elicit the imperatives of emancipatory action. Similarly, by the negation of responsibility to the mesh of instances we provide indicators for increasing the reflexivity of the term, transforming the impersonal to personal, establishing it as interactional notion rather than a one of institutional axiomatics.

The analysis employed is of abductive kind. From the evidence we try to abduct, discover its cause; appropriately to the responsibility discourse—"we try to find the culprit"—what

[1] In fact, this article was spurred by author's involvement in training for deinstitutionalisation in one of such institutions—situated in Črna na Koroškem, Northern Slovenia, adjacent to the Austrian border. The issue of responsibility "popped-up" whenever there was some kind of obstacle for doing things differently. This required a thorough thought about the very notion.

produces the power of resposibilisation. We use relevant theoretical concepts and practical examples to unearth it. Among theoretical concepts, most valuable seem to be of the Goffmanian tradition—they are productive in such a deconstruction of interaction, both in institution as well in public spaces. We also employ Castel's (1976) treatise of guardianship and Deleuze and Guattari (1972, 1980) notions of machinic assemblages and stratification of action.

On the other hand, the discussion is anchored in the reality of institutions and deinstitutionalisation. It draws from it and feeds in it. Examples form institutional life, community care and also from everyday life are used sometimes just as illustrations, but often also to test the validity of abstract conceptual considerations. In this, the examples are also instructive—they provide the idea how to organise the issues of responsibility in situations of teamwork, personal planning and of keyworkers. This gives a complementary programmatic dimension to otherwise critical discussion. Hence, also the tone of the paper, which, although analytic, often moves into essayistic mode, providing some relief and amusement, but also bit of freedom to explore, express and play. Aphorisms encourage meaningful action.[2]

2. Responsibility with no response

Responsibility is primarily a function of formal organisations. However, it is also a notion appearing in the everyday interactions. In the first instance it is about tasks, roles, competences, etc., in everyday life this word is often uttered as a resentment, reproach for not performing something (in the right way), for not fulfilling the other party's expectations as they are, although implicitly, defined in a kinship, partnership, friendship or work relationship. They are voiced as a warning—usually about the fact that in an interaction in hand other issues have to be observed apart from those happening then and there. When a wife, for example, complains to her husband that he is not a "responsible father", she is not merely bringing attention to a concrete mishap, but is evoking, although indeterminate, a general notion of what a father should be.

Always, when we encounter the notion of responsibility—be it in the institutional dealings, interaction of staff or in interaction with residents and their relatives—a trouble of a Kafkaesque sort arises. The responsibility is namely a very complex concept, with a multitude of meanings, mostly such that presuppose some virtual instance, usually a set of them, that we need to observe in our conduct. We know that someone in a certain situation expects something, but we do not know who (to whom we are really responsible) as we do not know what exactly is expected. The notion of responsibility seemingly provides clarity, but in fact nests confusion.

To assume that responsibility means, what the word could imply—a "capacity or aptitude to respond" would not be correct. However, there were attempts to redefine the term in this way, for instance, in the humanistic psychology (Frankl, Perls). Ascribing the meaning

[2]The paper does not follow the standard article form; however, it does not deviate from it very much. It does establish a line of thought, but not in a linear fashion. It starts with exposition—providing the context (institutions and deinstitutionalisation) and rationale of it (removing the responsibility as an obstacle for meaningful action). The main text is split into two parts. First is dedicated to scrutinisation of the term, it is analytic and critical. The second, in part maintains such a perspective, but simultaneously moves into a more deontological direction of transformative practice. Thus, we do not arrive at some final summarising conclusion but seek to provide direction of change ranging from a very concrete engagements of a key worker to the general imperatives of action. We want to stir and steer the action, and not merely stake the territory by defining its meaning.

of "response-ability" should be seen as an attempt to subvert the meaning of the concept that is really a concept of dominance, as a resistance to an indeterminate authoritarianism. However, this attempt is also a psychologization of this otherwise social and legal category. As a pun or a psychological experiment, although misplaced, it could be productive. It resists the "depersonalisation" that the term otherwise implies—mainly in delegation, relegation, undertaking responsibility and forming endless chains of it. A notion that is otherwise in Kafka's way subject-less, in this way restores the subjectivity of the actor, at least for a moment. Although only as an illusion, it frees the actor from the subordination to an indeterminate will of the other.

The act of responding automatically introduces a syntax of subordination. The one asking has the initiative, as the white pieces do in chess. Simultaneously, it also means that the subordinated should not "answer back", meaning that he or she should not have an opinion of her or his own, should not contest the authority. To "respond" is therefore an offence against the *responsibility*. But to be Black is OK, says Adorján (1989), a famous Hungarian chess player, known for his victories with black pieces. For him, this also means the struggle against apartheid, including the one he experienced himself and fought against as an activist for the rights of users of psychiatry.

The verb "to respond" is usually understood as a speech act when someone poses a question, or an act, a move that follows an act or a move of the other (respond to a phone call); sometimes it even refers to a rebellious gesture by one subordinated. The meaning of a duty or an obligation: "to be responsible" for somebody or something and to somebody or something comes only secondarily. The dictionary defines the noun "responsibility" with no reference to the basic meaning of the verb "to respond" or to the noun "response".

The common denominator of dictionary definitions of "responsibility" (Inštitut za slovenski jezik Frana Ramovša, n.d.; Merriam-Webster, n.d.) is in fact an absence of precisely the act of responding (to a question, a move). This basic meaning in the Slovenian dictionary is substituted by explanations based on relations to norm, obligation, consequences (negative), accountability, carefulness and obligation; it cites it as a synonym for "task" and "obligation".[3] In the concept of *responsibility* Slovene language (as English and others) takes away, subtracts from the act of *responding* the very essence of such an action, its immediate and actual reflexivity—responsiveness to concrete deeds, events. Reflexivity of category of responsibility is only indirect and virtual. It refers to the norms, demands and, even when it is "one's own" or a personal responsibility, to the *potential* consequences, that will only subsequently appear. It is a "reaction of the self" to something that does not yet exist (consequences) or to indeterminate and incorporeal instances, which expect, or usually demand, something due to the norms (and not derived from one's own acts). Besides the (prescribed) acts it demands from its subject (the object subjected to it) an apologetic reaction, justification, concern and carefulness.[4]

The notion of responsibility as it is defined in the dictionary therefore establishes a virtual domain (that plugs the bearer of the responsibility into the abstract dispositives of subordination) and puts a person into *a priori* subjected position. As such, the notion

[3]The English offer of synonyms is even more brutal: it is synonymous with either "blame" (accountability, liability) or "obligation" (duty, need, burden, commitment; Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

[4]The latter part of the expected or demanded usually takes place in a form of an inner, silent dialogue with the instance of authority. It becomes loud when it is a revolt against such an instance, a dissent – that becomes authentic responding, challenging the power—or, when the sanctions are pending, when a dormant authority sends its envoys or valets and demand—a response. In this moment responsibility remains still virtual, but the actual circumstance radically change—as it is in the case of prison conviction or placement in an institution.

of responsibility is not primarily a concept of a—psychological, sociological or social—interaction, but primarily a political, legal or legal-economic category.

Responsibility is a predicate category in the sense that it determines acts or qualifies events. It is determined as such by its two dedicated objects—and not by the syntactical subject, which we have shown to be just a simulacrum—primarily *to whom* or *to what*, and also *for whom* or *for what* we are responsible. There is no parental responsibility if there are no children. There is no responsibility of a keyworker if there is no responsibility for the user's wellbeing, for accomplishing the goals set by the user and for the effort for acknowledgement of the user's will. However, the object for which (or whom) we are responsible, establishes only the basis of a type of responsibility. Its finality is determined by the instance that we are responsible to. This is the predicate value of responsibility. As parents we are responsible principally to the children (and reflexively to ourselves as parents), however, concurrently we are responsible to the health authorities—to bring children for vaccination, school authorities—for children to learn a song and do their homework, etc. As keyworkers we are in the first place responsible to the user, but we are responsible also to our team—not to adapt the user's conduct to the demands of the team, but to advocate the user's will, amplify her or his voice so it gets heard. The first object—for whom or what we are responsible—provides the basis (substance) of responsibility, the second—to whom or what we are responsible—provides the form and the sense, direction.

3. For whom or what are we responsible?

3.1. Acts

In everyday thinking, we usually think, according to the spirit of capitalism (Weber), that we are taking responsibility for our acts. Mainly and ideally, for the acts that are a result of conscious decisions—*conscious acts*. This opens two strings of questions, one is on the difference of the decision and the act, the other on the issue of a "conscious act".

The *decision* can schematically and ideally be described as a choice of two or more alternative conducts. The decision is an act—of deciding. However, it is an inner act, not yet directly changing the outer reality, a virtual act that is only to be followed by an actual conduct. The decision to make a purchase is not yet a purchase, a decision to visit someone is not yet paying the visit.

A decision, as an inner act, is always negative—as the literal meaning of the word "decision" implies—it negates, cuts off the unchosen alternatives. When a decision becomes an actual act, its negative, excluding property becomes decisive. The fact is, that we can be sovereign in our decisions only when we decide to *not do* something. For deciding to do something, we need cooperation, involvement of others. As individuals, we can only decide not to have a baby, to have one we need a partner (or alternatively, an adoption service or medical reproduction support); we can only decide autonomously not to go to a party, for going to a party there needs to be a party. Even for solitary acts like solitaire we need cards, for writing a pen or a computer; even for seemingly totally autonomous acts like taking a walk, we need somewhere to take it, which is for an inmate of an isolation cell or tied to the bed only a thinkable luxury.

Decision making is a rational act. However, as a purely rational act (of thinking), it could never be transformed into an actual action. One may decide on the alternatives, then decide to enact the decision, then to enact it really, then to do it in the near future, then to do it even sooner etc. To bridge, to jump over this infinitesimal gap, to *do it now*, there must be an act of volition, the will. So, is it the will that propels the decision and its enactment, wherein the responsibility lies?

Another way of staging acts consciously is *planning* (a matter of utmost importance in care provision). Planning is, as opposed to mere decision making, an activity full of the intention and will. It also takes place in a hodological space (Lewin, 1951) in a rather rhizomatic manner (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980) in contrast to arborescent binary decision on a seemingly homogenised plane. In the practice of personal planning, that we have developed (Brandon & Brandon, 1994; Flaker et al., 2013; O'Brien & O'Brien, 2000; Rafaelič et al., 2013; Škerjanc, 1997) *setting goals* is the basic, pivotal feature, the hinges, on which the activity of planning revolves.

One of the main differences between deciding and setting goals is that deciding is a reactive deed and setting goals proactive. Decision making does not create anything new. It is primarily a response to existing options, a choice of pre-existing existence. Setting goals is more than choosing alternatives, it is their creation. It is a product of desire and not primarily of reason (reason without the desire is just a contemplation of the world; *reasonable conduct* is more-or-less a reflection of the supposed "reality"). In this, the desire is not be something that is situated beforehand just in a person, an individual, but in machinic connections with other(s) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972).

In everyday life, decision making and goals setting are interlaced—but still not the same. However, it is clear that the issue of responsibility in setting the goals does not arise as bluntly as in decision making. The owner of the plan does, with the act of planning, in fact assume the responsibility for his or her life and its course (not so much for single acts). This responsibility is an existential one. Actual responsibilities, in the ambiance of the plan, lie with those who take up the tasks listed in a personal plan. Hence, they are, for their own acts, tasks, reflexively responsible to the overall scheme (not the owner). For setting up the plan responsibility is with the owner and his or her will, for enacting it is a collective responsibility of all involved.

Where there is no, at least partially, conscious decision, then it not an act but rather an *event*. Events happen, they are not being done (but we can create them?). Natural events, for which we do not believe to be the making of deities, are no-one's responsibility. An involuntary (mind-less) action has a similar status—there is no crime if there is no subject of a criminal act. This lack of subjectivity is classically filled in by psychiatry (Castel, 1976; Toresini, 2014). In everyday minor "natural events", such as hiccups, sneezing, farting, etc. the responsibility for them is shed by apologising and distancing from embarrassing acts, inserting a difference between the (natural) event and the person (Goffman, 1963a); or by covering the act (like in the children's game of "taxi" Sluckin, 1981). Between the conscious acts with consciously intended consequences and the "natural" events there is whole grey zone of what could be termed accidents, with unintended consequences for which we could be called responsible.

In terms of acts, the notion of responsibility is usually, tied to task and duties—therefore to the acts that have been commissioned, ordered, the acts that we are not subjects of, only agents, executors of. This leads to the second question of "To whom or to what are we responsible?" (To be dealt with a little later.)

3.2. Things

The second class or register of what we can be responsible for are *things* and *people*. (It is still about acts—about what we do with the things and the people). Objects of a *corporeal* existence (spatially determinable and finite bodies), we can manipulate and, more importantly, appropriate and own. Appropriation could be seen as one of the constitutive elements of the responsibility, as the notion of property is being constituted primarily as a responsibility

to the other.

If an object is meant for personal use only, i.e., has only the use value and is a personal property, paradoxically, the ownership of the object absolves the owner of responsibility to the other and also to the object. What one does with such an object is exclusively a person's prerogative and is not anybody else's concern. However, in the consumerist, hyper-productive society we have become responsible even for the objects that we do not own any more—for the waste and sewage.

Responsibility for an object appears when an exchange value is ascribed to it. Producer and vendor need to provide warranties for the object they offer on the market. In such a case, the purchaser's responsibility is in the correct handling of the object (for making a warranty claim)—or the responsibility is a requirement of an external authority—a motor vehicle must be technically impeccable to be used on the public roads.

External responsibility to the other therefore arises when we use, handle or in any way dispose of the property which is subject to a certain claim by others. The category of responsibility arises from the necessary conditions of *alienation* and *property*.

When responsibility is about the issues that do not have a corporeal existence, such as: a state of things, situations, relations, we are in strife. On one hand there is no doubt that we are at least *partially* responsible for situations and relationships, in which we take part, on the other the very incorporeality of these "entities" prevents their handling and determinate appropriation. To be able to do so, we need to reify, objectify them in one way or another. *Reification or objectification* is thus a subsequent condition of generating the responsibility. The incorporeal objects are objectified primarily by words, but also other designations and signs that enable the metonymy of an act, a constellation or a relationship. Transport is not a thing, but it can be transformed into an exchange value objectified by the kilometres driven, or ticket issued, which will represent or even measure it.

Responsibility for acts, and also situations, relations and states, is derived from their effects. However, the responsibility is a measure of their negative effects or *consequences* of the acts. Negative—either when they are concerned to be "bad"—for us and even more so for others—or because of the absence of expected acts and their outcomes. For products, victories, achievements and successes we are praised, while for failures, losses and defeats we are responsible. Responsibility is thus an antiproductive, a losers' category—and the loss (or hazard of a loss) is its subsequent condition. (Responsibility, arising before the unwanted event, introducing the potential loss, is a warning of loss. It prevents the loss and so us from becoming losers. However, the antiproductive note of responsibility lies in its defensiveness—we are so scared of losing that we cease to be interesting in winning.)

3.3. People

When the issue of responsibility is about people, all these transpositions listed—reification, alienation and property, loss or negative consequences need to be performed. People have their bodies, but also have their own will. Reduction of people to things thus implies *a removal of their will* or subjecting their will to the will of the one who takes responsibility over them. Loss of the will also constitutes the condition of responsibility.

The condition of will-lessness is necessary in taking responsibility for people, but it is valid also in the other domains constituting the responsibility listed above. In situations and relationships, the will exists. A situated will is being assembled—not only as a resultant force of wills of participants, but also from the contingencies, materials, schemes that operate in them. Things that have their own (potential) force and power, in contact with a human being, acquire something like will, intention and power—this is obvious in machines. A

car has the intention and power of fast movement. As a device, it is also "responsible" for an accident resulting from excessive speed. However, we do not ascribe the responsibility for an accident to a car, but to the person behind the steering wheel. When the issue of responsibility arises in machinic assemblages, legal discourse needs to find the responsible subject (usually human, individual). If the subject is not found, the accident is described then as an event and not an act. It is not a criminal act or an offence, it is an accident. This could be the case of relieving anybody of the responsibility. In the institutionalised settings though, this is a case for installing guardianship. Guardianship, a surrogate responsibility, however, does not relieve the protégé of the responsibility, it doubles it in a Catch 22 like fashion. Both compliance with rules and expectations or transgression of them confirm the need of a guardian.[5]

The Figure 1 depicts the ramifications of the propositions of "for whom or what" of responsibility. In this constellation there are also dynamic items providing interaction between the diverse types of responsibilities (their effect is marked with the red arrows). The "acts" provide the notion of negative consequences, which feeds into also in the responsibility for "things" (bodies). These, in turn, are effected by the objectifying force stemming of objects and affecting the transformation of the people and situations into objects.



Figure 1. For what or whom responsibility

These two forces effect the "responsibility" under certain conditions that we have found in each element of being responsible for. When considering responsibility for acts, we found loss (negative consequences), with things we found alienation, in situations and relationships reification, in responsibility for people removal of will, and events have led us to the issue of ascribing.

We have extracted listed conditions of responsibility from individual elements of "respon-

[5] Heller's (1961) classic novel, Catch-22, humorously explores the predicaments and absurdities faced by a group of military airmen during World War II. Within the story, a "Catch-22" refers to an imaginary military regulation that, through its contradictory logic, all service members are compelled to follow. The term "Catch-22" has since become widely known, symbolising a no-win situation characterised by illogical and circular reasoning.



Figure 2. Conditions of responsibility

sibility for" (Figure 2). However, we can state, at least tentatively, that these are universal conditions necessary for constituting responsibility for anything (and anyone). In other words, to constitute responsibility there needs to be a threat of a loss, the item has to be alienated at least so it concerns others, it has to acquire characteristics of a thing at disposal, has to have its will removed and has to provide a possibility for responsibility to be ascribed to somebody.

Such a constellation of serial conditions of responsibilisation can be illustrated by a typical example of a person missing from an institution. The act of walking out is seen as a "loss". The assumption is that the walker-out will get lost, hence installing the loss in his act literally (and emphasising the negative consequences such as potential abuse, getting cold)—and neglecting the achievements of such an act as, for instance enhancing autonomy, getting to know the environment, new people, being able to ask for help. By proclaiming it as a "non warranted leave-taking" it is alienated from the actor (becomes the matter to be attended by others) and the situation is being reified, transformed out of an ordinary deed of e.g. "going to do shopping", "getting some fresh air" into a thing, an object requiring reaction of the authority. By ascribing this event to person's fallacy (by naming it "dementia", "profound intellectual disability", etc.) the human walking out (exit) will is negated and removed and the guardianship over it strengthened (and the walker in fact punished by further curtailment of his freedom).[6]

4. To whom or what are we responsible?

This question has many more answers to it than the previous one. They are, as we can see in the figure below, also more complex (complicated by taking up, relegating and accepting responsibility). On the other hand, they are more easily simplified, reduced to typical relations of responsibility. They can be reduced to being responsible to *us* or to *others*, that responsibility is distributed *down* and *up* the hierarchic ladders (the later division is

[6]N.B. the order or appearance of the conditions is usually not as linear as the telling of it. It is more circular or even rhizomatic—enhancing each other. For example, ascribing the walk out to dementia transforms the act into event, automatically removing the persons will and making it amenable to reification and alienation.

represented in the Figure 3 by a provisional red cutting line).



Figure 3. To whom or what we are responsible

When we are responsible to superiors, there is a difference between the responsibility we bear to concrete bosses and to impersonal instances. This difference establishes a qualitative difference in the character of responsibility—of being personal or impersonal. This significantly affects the nature of interchange between the bearers of the responsibility. If it is a personal one, it is easier to contradict, complain or even defy it. Impersonal instances are the way to make resistance sterile. When superiors quote rulebooks, inspections, higher authorities, etc., they mask their actual expectations or demands that they are imposing by such claims. The victims of responsibilisation are, by this manoeuvre, prevented from actively contesting the actual interest of the superior.

In the public services and regarding public matters we are responsible to the public—not only in politics, always when we do something in the public interest. However, the public

is too general a term, not easy to define. It is a general abstraction, but also a concept describing an infinite happening. The public is never a finite number of people, there is always a next member of the public who may join. It is akin, if not identical, to the notion of a "sublime community" that we found necessary to affirm the imperative of non-exclusion (Flaker, 2016a, 2016b).

Although there may be a sense of public being superordinated, it is not so in principle. The public is a democratic concept, it is an egalitarian set and setting for everybody. However, in it, in the concept and the reality, there tend to appear endorsed *representatives* of the public. The representation striates an otherwise smooth space, it creates virtual segments over the real public surfaces, alcoves hiding the doings of representatives—from the public view. A court, a tribunal is a major such representative of the public interest, specialised in the issues of responsibility. And, it is "extraterritorial"—it creates a territory outside the real public space and separated from other branches of authority.

As a representation of public, community is a more concrete, yet still very abstract notion. In small towns, for instance, everything happens "in the public gaze"—a limited set of audience figures as a universal public. A community can be defined either as a *communion*—people coming together for common matters—or as an *audience*—just happening to watch—a show that is staged for them. The deinstitutionalisation should bring these two aspects of the community together, into a double and mutual responsibility of a community and an institution situated in it becoming one and the same instance, becoming an actor and an audience. To the community we should be responsible not only vertically—also horizontally.

Opposite to superordinated social structures are located those, which are the base of our action, those which delegate responsibility to us, for something to be done for them and, by this, being responsible to them—like functionaries are in the first place responsible to the members of an association. In the issue of responsibility, we need to distinguish between the base, in which responsibility is solidary, therefore collective and undivided,[7] and the base, in which responsibility is individual (and chain-serial), as it is a case in the service responsibility. Both being of substantial importance for our discussion.

On one side, it is important that our work has a mandate from the community, that we serve it and not some alienated social segment, its authority. On the other side it is also important that we preserve the very basic and essential element and moment of working with people, which is based on the *service model*, in which the responsibility is formed primarily in relation of the professional to the service user (Goffman, 1961), in the classic service parlance—a client.

When the responsibility is modelled in service manner it is a double responsibility—specifically, we are responsible to a user, who is also a commissioning instance; generally, as professionals, we are responsible to the profession. Profession is not a "calling" (*vocatio*) from above, as in ecclesiastic, religious callings. In "liberal" professions it is a vow ("profess") to serve the community according to the ethics of the profession (Flaker, 2006). This vow functions also as a warranty for the user that professionals will perform their work professionally, in accordance with the professional ethics. Also, that they are operating on the basis of the "tariff system" and do not charge for their services on the basis of the market logic of offer and demand (not exploiting the user's distress to raise the service fee).

[7] Solid, indivisible is the linguistic root of the term solidarity, which was originally a legal term addressing the issue of collective responsibility, and only then transposed by the working-class movements in to a social and political concept (later taken up also by the church and the state).

Between the solidary community and serial client base responsibility there is a complementary, but also conflictual relation. The conflict can appear between the group and individual desires, as it is often addressed in teamwork (Flaker, 1996), where a role of key-worker can surmount the contradiction between what is good for the group and what is important for a person. From the point of view of the service model (Goffman, 1961) the responsibility of the professional to the community can be a hindrance (deviation) to the service relationship. As it often happens when relatives, neighbours exert pressure on the service and are thus actually commissioning the professional work—to be performed upon the user. The two settings of the professional responsibility can become complementary for the most part (and perhaps only in this case) when the professional assumes an advocacy role, that is, when the user defines the service as a tool for changing the social tissue of the community.

4.1. To be responsible to oneself?

Reviewing the superordinated instances to which we bear responsibility we encountered a (Kafkaesque) difficulty of obscurity of instances and general nature of categories. When we take up the question of the *responsibility to oneself*, our torment is of the same intensity. The concept of the *self* is actually very concrete in its manifestation, is still a labyrinth—hard to get around.

Responsibility to oneself can be (and it is) responsibility to one's own values—be it our principles, like nowadays Health, professional ethics and stance—or some other matter. However, it is usually about the transmitted values, the matters transcending the actual situation, in which we act. This transcendence negates the reflexivity of the situation at hand, and by this also the virtue of the self. Internalised values may form our personality, persona, character, but not necessarily affect our *selves*—what we actually experience we are. The responsibility to oneself can be rather sought and found in the consistency of action, this effectively mirrors our values and really reflects the situational challenges.

The fact that responsibility to the self is reflected and even expressed in the interaction with others, brings us on the track of responsibility to near ones—fellow members of a household, kinship, friendship. In terms of proximity, these are close to each other and connate, however, their milieu is different. In households the responsibility is expressly one of solidarity. All members are responsible for everything belonging to a household, ownership is communal. (Precisely this constitutes problems of responsibility in group homes, since the communally used property is not owned by its members but by the organisation running it—it is not a common property, owned by the residents.[8])

Kinship, not bound to the same household anymore, has, however, inherited some of this kind of logic. But its solidarity is not as compact and is also, not unlike feudal responsibility, segmented. The household experience is situational, bound to a common space, the kinship experience is bound to the network of relatives and lineages and our place in it. Responsibility to the friends is not bound neither to the space nor to the preestablished ties—it is a luxury of responsibility. It is simultaneously an exceptionally

[8]Here, we refer to the practical, actual ownership, which is not necessarily a legal one. For example, tenancy, lease, renting are instruments that warrant temporary use-ownership, although the nominal owner of the property remains the legal holder of the property right. However, the group home residents do not enjoy such a right. They are not tenants in the flat, they are guest, just residents, users. Practically, this means that cannot use the space (and what belongs to the space) freely within a lease contracts, but are subjects to continuous regimentation of the owner of the place (the organisation running it).

strong responsibility and a less binding one. Bound to the will of participants—not by a contract—but by a friendship commitment, covenant.

Responsibility to the close ones is, of course, a responsibility to the other, but a reflexive one. By this reflexive virtue, it becomes responsibility to oneself. It is reflexive in the construction of a self. In the inter-ACTION, mutual action, we experience ourselves as an active agent (a subject of action). The manifestation of responsibility is in the immediate experience of acting, doing (and existing). This experience is enabled by the matter that we act upon (feeling of movement, emotion, thought, etc.) as well as in the recognition of the very action, deed as our own.[9] The tragic virtue (property) of the responsibility is that at the end you are always responsible to your own self.

Thus, we can contend that responsibility is a category of action. Even when it is about things the notion of responsibility introduces the possibility of handling, disposing of something, i.e., doing something with things. However, it is even more so a contemplative category. The responsibility must be discerned and apperceived; often so that it is likewise apperceived by others and returned to the actor as something, a thing (effect, reified action or situation), a matter of his or her responsibility. This return, reflexion has a performative postulate—a moral demand that we must do something with this thing. The demand is not derived only from the situation at hand, from an encounter of two people, it is a double evocation, reference to—outer authority, e.g., relatives of a resident, inspectorate, guardians; and, to the possibility of a loss, a failure.

This double reference instigates a conduct, which is not responding the situation at hand, and is therefore constituted away from the actual responsibility in the encounter; additionally, it can even suspend the responsibility which the actor legalistically bears. For example, a legal guardian (and other participants in the situation) should, even though they are responsible for decisions, take into account (be reflexive to) the will and desires of the protégé. However, this important, major part of responsibility fades away in the face of such referring and evocation—in fact, the responsibility is defensive and reactive to the presumed, often implicit, authorities and negative consequences.

[9]Dreams, as a way of thinking and feeling, are also work (dreamwork). In dreams, we do things, we meet people, experience them. When they are intense, they feel important. However, in the contemporary rational (Cartesian) civilisation, even though we have dreamed them, created them, we have no sense of responsibility for them, for the events in them, even for the actions that we ourselves have committed in our dreams. When our dream action is not in line with our values, we may have "a bad conscience" (or, on the contrary, we can be proud or happy to have succeeded in something), but we do not shed the slightest notion of being responsible. Firstly, because we do not register dreams as an act, but as an event. Dreams, including actions we attribute to ourselves in them, happen to us. We are absolved of the responsibility for the dreams yet more by the assumption that dreams have no effect in everyday, interpersonal realities. This assumption is quite justified, but not entirely. Certainly, it is not valid in the case of Martin Luther King's "dream". His dream of equality is to be understood primarily as a metaphor, but not only as such.

The responsibility for dreams is, however, being taken in psychoanalysis when we verbalise (and thus reify) and interpret them. Even more radical, but also more fun, is taking responsibility for dreams in processing them in the manner of Gestalt therapy or psychodrama. In these practices, we stage dreams and thus "appropriate" the parts of a dream that, in the very dreams, we have attributed to others. In doing so, we take responsibility for them—to ourselves (and the audience of the staging)—but still not in the realities of everyday life. A step forward, but in the opposite direction, is the creation of dreams, a proactive attitude towards them. In psychosynthesis and similar orientations, as well as in some indigenous practices, dreams have, most likely justifiably, a collective existence and are open to a conscious action. Of course, in this reality, which differs from an everyday one, responsibility is structured differently and is far from the concept of responsibility addressing the responsibility to others in the frameworks of social hierarchy and the imperative of responsibility towards the public discussed above.

To the specific responsibility, determined by the frame of interaction with the close ones, a general responsibility to the fellow human being must be added. Apart from a fuzzy, not productive and abstractly general postulate of humanity, this can be an involuntary, spontaneous reaction to a person's distress, as, for instance, when we intercept somebody in the moment of falling. This is an immediate response, beyond the conditions of responsibility listed above. Hence, such acts should be more appropriately designated as *responsiveness*, even though we trace in them a "proto responsibility", a germ of responsibility. Such a response in nevertheless a moral one; even if involuntary, or even unconscious, springing out of mere presence and not from any other relation to a fellow human. But it is apperceived as such only retrospectively—we are responsible because we performed the act, and we did not act because we are responsible.

Discussing the issue of "to whom or what are we responsible", we roamed from the responsibility that we bear to those above to the one that we receive from below. In the latter, we have identified the difference between the responsibility to others and to oneself. Two basic registers of responsibility have become apparent. Responsibility is perceived and recorded in the framework constituted by some external, institutional system of rules, values, social demands and responses (sanctions), which exists independently from immediate exchanges, nevertheless still setting them. Responsibility is being formed reflexively also on the plane of immediacy, as an interactional phenomenon. If it is not sponsored by the interfaces of the former, we can say that it is principally about responsiveness (which indicates the semantic difference between how we lexically define "response", "responding" and the dictionary meaning of their derivative—"responsibility"). In the everyday interaction, however, the regime of reference of the responsibility is mixed. In referring to their own or contesting the responsibility of others, participants evoke, as a token of immediate interaction, an external frame, something that in fact in not an immediate property of the interaction at hand.

5. Deal with the devil?

The responsibility constitutes in part the contractual relationship. The *quid pro quo*—the exchange of goods and services—something is given, and something received in exchange—is the basis of such a relationship. Since a contract is only yet a virtual exchange, it has to contain the *responsibility* that the matter of the contract will be realised (and effected in the proper way, as the parties have had agreed).

A contractual relationship is a basic one in the bourgeois order. While contractual relations are, in feudal order, overcoded by the responsibility in the hierarchy of relationships, the capitalistic social arrangement demands and enables, creates equality of the participants in such a relationship. Additionally, it gives ground to the axiom of universal responsibility of one's own action.

Still schematically, we encounter two sets of difficulties. First, not all the relations are contractual—quite on the contrary most of human interaction happens outside such a frame. The second is that we can form a contract that negates the very contractuality—a deal with the devil.

Among the relations that escape the frame of contractual relations there are two categories relevant to our discussion. Everyday interaction order in a public space (Goffman, 1963a, 1983) is based on similar assumptions of equality of people and, of *bona fide*, with good faith to fellow humans that we encounter. However, the exchange is not *prima facie* an economic one (of exchanging goods and services), but one of exchange of mutual respect and acknowledgement of the other's personality, persona. Exchanges are of a ceremonial

kind and do not necessarily have an instrumental character.

Quite on the contrary, pronounced instrumentality in relationships like friendship (a higher and conventional form of this kind of relations), corrupts, damages the essence of such a relationship. The necessity of naivety and of good faith in an encountered human being are pertinent to the conception of interaction in a public space. However, it is amply used for their own gain by beggars, street vendors and those chatting up girls (or boys). Mostly this is experienced as an atavistic nuisance to the urban pacific, even though the modern, bourgeois public most probably evolved out of medieval bazaars, which had skilfully employed the mixture of familiar, public and economic nature of human exchanges.

On the other side, we have a heap of asymmetric relations that Tönnies (2002) describes as the basis of the community (*Gemeinschaft*) against the society (*Gesellschaft*), which in turn is based on contractual relations. A paradigmatic case of such relations is the relation of parents and children, in which some are giving and others getting. Such a guardian, custodian relation is notable, with, for our discussion, inessential variations, for all the relations of help and assistance.

Such relations, as asymmetrical as they are, still provide gains for the parties involved. For instance, we could maintain that parents get out of parenthood even more than the children (in the way of status, emotions, even materially). However, the gains do not come directly from the actual exchange, they are a calculus, differential of the relation, a secondary benefit derived from the status difference. The intergenerational solidarity (or exchange) establishes a correction of such asymmetry, but only indirectly, it is not an immediate, actual contractual relation.

The stigma, which is defined by Goffman (1963b) as a discrepancy between the virtual and actual identity—between what a person should be and what he or she actually is, is a notion that conjoins both categories of relations that escape contractuality. It is a warning that a person we are dealing with is not capable of a symmetric interaction which the interaction order, although very loosely, demands. In this, it automatically places the interactant into a class of those, who should be under some sort of guardianship, sponsorship. This, at least partially, provides a possibility to link to the register of contractual relationships. By disqualifying and discrediting it protects the essence of the contractual relationship, while it provides the discredited with an indirect entrance via his or her representative, a patron.

In the actual act of stigmatisation, the disqualification is a real act and effect, while the option of indirect linking remains a potential outcome. Social order takes care that this happens almost automatically, that guardianship over the discredited is an automated social response. The outcast cannot exist in the bourgeois order, in the conditions of global capitalism there is no "no man's land", where lepers could build their colony (although there are cracks in this order which can be inhabited by a modern outcast—or maybe better podcasts; Flaker, 1998).

The next discordant issue in entering into contractual relationships is that it is often, besides the contract of two equal parties, also a contract with the devil—with someone, or better something, that we cannot be equal to. The appearance of an employment contract or of an agreement for (voluntary) placement into an institution is a contractual one—for a certain amount of work I will be getting a certain salary, for a fee I will get a roof over my head and some services. However, by signing such a contract we have signed also to a transmutation of a free and equal subject into a subjected one, one that has to obey the house rules, submit to a hierarchy that pervades such an inegalitarian space.

Actually, such social spaces are exceedingly plentiful in comparison to those, in which we are actually equal and free. Spaces, in which pure contractual relations are possible,

can be found in the purely economic segment of society. The equity of real public spaces (surfaces) does not establish the contractual relations. Even political space, supposedly democratic, is structured unequally and reduces "the contract" to periodic elections. The existing safety fuses, mechanisms to prevent a total withdrawal of contractual subjectivity, can never preclude at least "partial removal of contractual capacity" that inevitably happens upon entrance into so structured a space. This capacity can be reinstated completely only by exiting such an arrangement, by signing out. This in turn usually means that we will go and hire out our labour to yet another "devil"—or "to go on our own".

Deinstitutionalisation can be seen as an option for an equalising exit. It is a utopia of possible social spaces, in which freedom and equality are possible and doable, in which they do not halt at the doorstep.

6. Deinstitutionalisation—negation of the negation of the responsibility

Perhaps a little too hastily, we will have a look at the issue of responsibility in the frame of deinstitutionalisation. A first reflex could be to deinstitutionalise the responsibility itself, to negate its binding power. In the same breath we will claim that deinstitutionalisation is a process, in which people finally resume their responsibility, lost by commitment to an institution (and often by concurrent loss of legal capacity, by relegation of responsibility to the legal guardian). In other words, the less a person can decide on his or her actions, dispose of her things, be an equal participant in a situation, express his or her will, the more things are happening to her, the more she is prevented from doing, creating themself, there is less opportunity to be "responsible" (or "co-responsible"). Emancipation is a precondition for taking up responsibility.

When we want to affirm re-owning of the responsibility there is a surprising turn. We need to negate all the conditions of responsibility outlined above (Figure 2):

Act	→	loss	→	achievement, success
Thing	→	alienation	→	reappropriation, accent on the use value
Situations	→	reification	→	humanisation
People	→	removal of will	→	expression of will
Events	→	ascribing	→	describing (destigmatisation—dedramatisation, interest).

Achievements and accomplishments need to be counterposed to the losses (harm, danger in the parlance of risk). Reappropriation and insistence on the use value need to contest the alienation: humanisation must counter reification (of situations, a person). Removal of someone's will needs to be replaced by its expression. Ascription of vile traits to people needs to give way to destigmatisation—either banalisation, dedramatisation of the event or genuine interest in it—hence a phenomenological approach (epoché—bracketing of prejudices and precomprehension, describing instead of explaining and horizontal equivalence of the described).

Another step that deinstitutionalisation needs to take on the issue of responsibility is a shift from the virtual to the actual responsibility (from its Kafkaesque to a Poohesque form of expression). From the responsibility to virtual, superordinated instances to a responsibility to one's own base. The step needs to be taken towards reaffirmation of the service model so that it becomes free, emancipated from institutional schemes and moves from repairing to creating and enabling. This very emphasis on the creativity of a professional enables the shift from the notion of responsibility to responsiveness.

Affirmation of responsibility in the frame of deinstitutionalisation is a paradox, but a

dialectic one. It is a negation of the conditions of responsibility, but in this, a negation of a negation. The conditions of responsibility deciphered above, are namely transformative—by introducing the significance of the negative consequences they transform acts, situations and people into (quasi)corporeal entities and thus negate their essence. The intention of the deinstitutionalisation is therefore: reanimation of these qualities, inspiring the soul into things that have had lost it, humanisation and reappropriation of situations, making events ordinary, everyday-like and, creation of a new, decidedly more machinic, assembled subjectivity. It is therefore a shift from abstract postulates to concrete challenges, a dialectic move that transmutes the elements of the classic responsibility to become closer to everyday life, more human, empowering the person. Such an affirmation and transformation of responsibility abolishes it as a disciplinary mechanism, as a leverage of control—to the point that it is becoming questionable whether we are still considering a *responsibility*.

6.1. Responsibility of a keyworker

In the first place, a keyworker is responsible for wellbeing, welfare—a better life of a user. What is in principle always true when working with people, becomes a leading imperative in the role of a keyworker. As a general principle, it can be arbitrarily moulded by any professional. Usually so that their role and relation to the user keep becoming more and more custodian and less and less advocating—since a mandate delegated from above permits the role definition, in which the professional "knows better" what is "good for the user" and that the professional responsibility to a user is understood in such a way. A keyworker should not have such a wide space of manoeuvre.

For a keyworker, the mandate from a user is essential. It is usually accorded in a personal plan. But this is not enough. A personal plan is chiefly a matrix of thought directing the joint effort; it paves a shared path. It is also an expression of the user's will, however, only a document of it. As such, it remains virtual, something that has only to be accomplished in the actuality. The actual mandate has to be created in an actual encounter of two people; in a mutual trust, respect, bond, even a plot. Practically this means sincerity, quest and creation of common values, which provide the base for attachment. It means also the testing of a keyworker—a user needs to know that his or her keyworker is ready to take a risk greater than just doing her or his job, that he or she means something to the worker as an actual person and that he or she is ready to "put in something extra".

The main work that a keyworker needs to perform is the organisation of care (a person centred one), to implement the personal plan. The plan is a response to the person's life situation, but the role of the keyworker is also to respond to specific life situations, the necessities that happen while effecting the plan and beyond. This is a difference between a keyworker and a planner. The plan is a comprehensive (holistic) response to a person's situation. It is this virtual nature of the plan that enables such comprehensiveness. Carrying out the plan, the task of a keyworker, however, implies coping with an actual situation at hand. This involves the dialectics between the imagined and the real, it is testing the reality, which always unearths issues that the (virtual) plan did not nor could not have foreseen.

The work of a keyworker—the organisation and coordination of all the tasks and providers the plan enlists, can be seen as a service—work done on the basis of user's commission (as "service" is defined in Slovene language, cf. Flaker, 2015). However, this service is one of an advocacy type. It is defined as such in its kernel by the user-worker relationship, in the actuality by common effort to overcome obstacles while implementing the plan—an unavoidable certainty due to the socially difficult position and status of users.

The task of a key worker is thus to *enable* the user to do and make things in his or her

life, which he or she desires. So, the basic responsibilities of a keyworker are therefore deeds. In the first place, for their own actions, but also for the joint action, and in this way also for the action of the user. However, a keyworker is not responsible for *what* the user does, his or her responsibility lies in enabling the action. For his very deeds the user himself is responsible. The responsibility of a keyworker is not only in acknowledging such user's responsibility and to support it, but also to perceive the user (and his or her deeds) through the "strengths perspective" and to present them to others as an accomplishment and success. (The immanent, situational definition of our deeds is usually that we perform them for our use, pleasure or joy. The negative consequences that might happen as we do something, are in everyday life considered as an accident, an event. They are seen as a secondary, accidental and unwanted side of our deed.)

The responsibility of a keyworker lies also in constant alertness to and reversal of sets opposite to the strengths perspective. In the wording of the conditions of responsibility, it is of the utmost importance to fight against "ascribing" responsibility for events to users and their stigmata. Slips, mistakes and other undesired events are not to be ascribed to the user's stigma. In the first place, because stigma is not an action, a truly predicative category, it is neither a cause nor a motive of an action. In the case of the "self-fulfilling prophecy", for instance, it may seem that somebody performs an action because of his or her secondary deviation—he or she has nothing to lose, has got the label anyway. However, the social reaction marking a person has been an active part of a constellation and had triggered the action. In the second place, because stigmatised effect is not a wilful action, but something that occurs in effecting some other intention, it is an unfortunate event, an accident. And not least, because such an understanding of a person's action disables the flow of interaction, disqualifies the person and suspends the desired action. A keyworker has, for his own sake and for the audience, two weapons of resistance to such tendencies. Negative aspects or consequences of the action can be banalised, listed in the class of events of non-importance, negligible or situationally irrelevant acts that can happen to absolutely anyone. On the other hand, instead of ascribing such deeds to stigma, trying to really grasp them—now as a virtue and not a flaw—and to present them as such to the audience.

The joint work of the user and a keyworker is to create conditions that will enable the attainment of the goals of the personal plan (and also minor desires and wants that spring up by the way along with fulfilling the plan). It is a continuation of the work that has started by planning (with a planner), it is animating the letters on paper. Their joint task is therefore to establish and maintain the machinery that would produce the outcomes foreseen in the plan.

The responsibility of a keyworkers for their own doing is in the first place service-like. *Inter alia*, this means that their desires, and more importantly interests, as well as tasks delegated by the milieu are bracketed, subdued to the commission (will) of the user. This is the expression of the professionalism of a keyworker.

This, however, does not imply that a keyworker should become a robot who will perform her or his work according to "instructions" contained in a personal plan. Quite the contrary, he or she must create possibilities for authentic encounters with the user. There are at least three implications of this. The encounter needs to take place in the frame of working together—by common goals, common object of work and on the basis of common values. However, almost contrary to the instrumental nature of service relationship, a keyworker needs to have a real, authentic interest in this process. A keyworker's own interests can lie in at least three directions. Most obvious is professional, work emancipation. A keyworker has an opportunity, precisely because of the primary importance of the user's mandate, for

an independence and critical autonomy from the structures otherwise directing her or his work. This opens the possibility to *really* do something for the person. According to the principle of exchangeability ("I could easily find myself in such a position"), working for the user is also working for oneself. This constitutes the basis of solidarity. The third direction is the direction of identification with the user, doing the same thing. Numerous situations provide possibilities for a keyworker to attain his purely personal goals. If I accompany a user to a shop, I can buy something too.

The work situation needs to be taken by all parties as a frame—not only for working together but also in which to encounter each other. Major opportunities for such encounters are moments, when producing an outcome, a result is not at the forefront, e.g., in the process of initially getting to know each other or in a celebration of success or in moments of rest, when we are, as Camus's Sisyphus, smilingly returning to the foothill. The encounters can, therefore, happen in the human cracks of a common undertaking. The nature of joint work is not in the first place contractual, it is conspiratory.

A keyworker must unfailingly follow the moto of user movements: "Nothing about us without us!". The responsibility is to make sure that the user is present in all the deliberations that concern her or him. When this is not possible or sensible (this sensibility needs to be recognised concordantly with the user), a detailed report is due as to enable the user to control the course of events, or advertently to appeal or even veto (in the wording of interaction order, to have a possibility of "remedial actions"). The notion of remedial interaction is especially important for unplanned conversations that happen "by the way", where a user's presence and immediate control could not have been assured. The keyworker must report to the user these mentions, chats, but also convey to participants during the very exchange that he will do so and assure the possibility for corrections that the user might want—approximately in the same manner as it happens when we talk about a friend. Namely, if someone says something about our friend, the speaker assumes that we will relate this to our friend. The assumption usually remains implicit, though there may be an explicit request "not to tell this" to the friend being mentioned. When we inhabit the role of a keyworker (or any other confidential professional relationship) this request will be declined, naturally, often also explicitly alerting the collocutor that we will relate the content of the conversation to the user.

The personal plan resembles a testament as an act of expressing a person's will. Obviously, it radically differs in the fact that the person is still alive. More so, it is a tool of reviving someone—precisely the user's will. The responsibility of a keyworker is therefore affirmation of the user's will—always and everywhere. In doing so, a personal plan is the frame and the footing, upon which a keyworker can refer. A keyworker is a living reminder, a memento of the user's will. As a lighthouse, he has to remind everybody involved in the care that they must sail in the direction set by user.

Actually, this is the responsibility a keyworker has to others. As for the user, a keyworker needs to, at least for that moment, leave other roles: of a carer, a nurse, habilitator, animator or any other, and be principally a keyworker. His or her role in a team and responsibility to the team-mates is precisely in taking up this role and advocacy stance. It is a corrective, which person centred care demands in the conditions of collective performance of tasks, a corrective of a person against the group. If a group is planning a trip, the keyworker will draw attention to problems that the person has with walking, if they are preparing a pudding for a party, he will remind them that the user has diabetes, etc. When keyworkers remind a team of such shortcomings of the group decision, they must not be seen by a team as "party poopers", spoilers of the game that the team is supposed to play. On the

contrary, a keyworker must be seen as an official "devil's advocate", who will, precisely by this "responsible" opposition, improve the team performance. The team needs to convey this to a keyworker from the very start, and grant him or her the right, even obligation, to do precisely that.

6.2. Metamorphosis of the responsibility

Deinstitutionalisation or metamorphosis of the "responsibility" thus takes various routes, on various levels. The most obvious and celebratory shift is *restoring the responsibility to users*. The shift is from institutional, hierarchic and custodial to *civil* responsibility. Civil responsibility presupposes that everyone is responsible for his or her own acts and that nobody can take over the responsibility for the acts of others—who are just like him or her responsible for their acts. On the declarative level this shift is taken for granted, as it stems from the basic social arrangement we inhabit. On the practical level though, at least in the sphere of care, this appears so radical that it is often very hard for actors to grasp and put into practice. A small step for humankind, a big step for a man.

The main reason for this difficulty is not potential "learned" nor innate helplessness of users, the reasons lie on the other side—in the classic orientation, the mind-set of the professionals and other helpers, as well as social arrangements (usually on the micro level) that demand it. When a person in a wheelchair with his escort enter a dispensary, shop or even in a street encounter, the doctor, shop attendant or a passer-by will address the escort—and by doing this take the responsibility away from the person in the wheelchair, in the very literal and basic sense—capacity to respond. One of the problems namely is general distribution of responsibility, which is not in fact, as it would be commanded by the fundamental principles of the bourgeois society of the equals. We actually spend a smaller portion of our lives in spaces and relations that are not hierarchical and condescending. People marked by stigma, especially with institutional stigma, cannot evade such patterns in everyday situations without huge effort and ingenuity.

The responsibility of an escort at this point is to direct the interaction to the right address. Such redirection, attention to wrongly targeted, misplaced interaction and remedial action on them is probably one of the main characteristics of the "professional responsibility" in the conditions of the transition to community care. The responsibility of the "helpers" is not only in providing services (or in favours and courtesies in informal care), but also in redirecting the perspective and empowering users in the presence of wider audiences.

A helper, though, ceases to be responsible for the deeds of the helped. The transition to the community has taken the helper out the space and the role, in which one has to assume the responsibility for the action of the other. He still needs to struggle with the reflex of the previous role, but is relieved of such a role (no matter how hefty this relief is). This, however, does not imply that he is completely absolved from the professional responsibility. It is just set and structured differently.

The primary professional responsibility is now to provide quality services. Namely care that will be more user centred and tailored, and that will be provided by the highest standards of the profession (and of the transition to the community). By being relieved of the responsibility for the acts of users, a professional helper has more room to dedicate to his or her real work. The previous, guardian role not only took time and energy to maintain, the respective roles of a guardian and a protégé spoiled what could be an encounter of two free human beings into a preformed relation of submission. Trust needed in an accidental encounter or confidence rooted in a friendship, kinship and comradeship that was previously replaced by the hypnotic trance of submission (*sic* psychoanalysis), now has room to develop.

Quality becomes a shared responsibility. The service it is not modelled any longer as repairing an apparently closed system, but as creating new solutions, arrangements, etc., as enabling attainment of the user's goals, projects. This requires the cooperation of a number of helpers, who, in contrast to the repair model, are not present in the same space—an institution, a workshop, and are not serving the same master. Shared responsibility spills over an open space and is structured horizontally and rhizomatically.

As we have demonstrated the important shift in the new conception of responsibility is also a shift from the responsibility for things (or reified acts, situations and relations) to the responsibility for acts. Unveiling the figment (and compulsion) of individuality, it becomes clear that we cannot be (individually) responsible for relationships, situations and things (see the discussion above). Conditionally, we can be responsible for our own acts. Those we can ascribe to ourselves; albeit, not entirely (because they are, *inter alia*, responses to the acts of others). The acts of care, are almost always tied to acts of others, joined in a common effort, action. Hence, the responsibility of the helper for his acts, services, is always also a responsibility for cooperation, connecting—for teamwork.

The latest trump card pulled out of their sleeve by professionals as they bid farewell to the responsibility of the old kind is to ask: "What to do when a user does something dangerously?!" This by no means remains the helper's pre-emptive responsibility. Responsibility in advance, the anxiety, the apprehension paralyses the action—for the patronage all the more so. Therefore, even when it comes to future planning actions, we must, in the risk-weighing process, put safety in the second place. First, we plan an act, more precisely its goal, the purpose of the action, only then the safety of the proceeding.

However, a helper must respond to a danger, but in the same way as anybody else—no matter whether an accidental passer-by, a friend, neighbour or brother. A professional helper has one reason more to remain in the situation of danger and to do something that will diminish it, reduce the risk or mend the damage. Not to abandon helping is (as in the Hippocratic Oath) a sacrosanct professional duty. The Alpine Rescue Service will help anyone who is in trouble, even if rescuers will nag about recklessness, equipment inadequacy and a similar lack of caution and safety measures by the one they are saving. The responsibility of a professional helper in a dangerous situation is therefore—situated, reflexively human, not aprioristic nor custodian. When it comes to professional help, also reliable and available.[10] In the institution the residents are available to staff, in the community the staff needs to be available to users.

6.3. Joint responsibility of being human

Helpers (and users with them) have, on account of working together, an immediate responsibility to others participating in the "singular project of help" or in accomplishing the goals of a personal plan or some other such doing. This kind of responsibility is reminiscent of Durkheim's *organic solidarity*. It is an awareness that if everybody does not do his or her share of joint work, the work will not be done—also by the one who has done his bit. Although it may seem that joint work is regulated mainly by an agreement of co-workers

[10]In social care this is a role of crisis mobile teams and interventions. Their present insufficiency is felt mostly by users—they are either not getting help when it is most needed, or they are locked up "in a safe place" to prevent danger. A mountain rescue service can be seen as a connivance to recklessness in the mountains, however, we could not imagine abolishing it, even less, locking mountaineers in institutions where they could safely climb artificial slopes (or peel potatoes for punishment). In fact, the security promised (but not delivered) by institutions encourages professional helpers not to go out, even if the situation on the ground is significantly less menacing than that faced by mountain rescuers.

on the division of work—be it formal or not—the unuttered, even nonverbal contingencies of joint work might be more important. Among them, the work rhythm of working together and mechanisms of mutual projective identification—when we assume what co-workers will do while we are doing something else, what they expect from us, still more, what we expect that they expect that we expect from them. When we list and analyse these assumptions, we may have an impression that collaboration would be quite complicated (and so it is), but they happen in an instant, in nanoseconds and often, just as an atmosphere, as group assumptions and mentality they pervade a group entirely (Bion, 1961; Flaker, 2022).

The vision, goals of a work group can represent the group's inner and actual desire, something they want to accomplish, or it can come from outside—as a care plan on the personal level, or more generally as some kind of a binding document as any formal declaration, convention, strategy, etc. The latter was not available to pioneers of deinstitutionalisation, their vision was their group desire for change, equality, emancipation. With deinstitutionalisation as a global platform, which actually commands such a desire, the activists of the transition obtained the legal basis—a socially agreed foundation of their action. In the beginning, the issue was how to legitimate desire of a group, make it a legal body; now, the issue is how to actualise a historical desire, crystallised in a document, how to transform it into an actual desire of those affected.

However, a declarative vision is just a frame of the action—an accessory for the production of desires of participants in a situation and their realisation. The institutional desire is, in the first place, a frame for cooperation, joint work, which provides the institutional basis and sets the direction of joint work. It is not yet the work itself, the actual desire. This needs to happen, arise among the people, it needs to respond to their existential questions, and to be soaked by "blood, sweat and tears" (Flaker, 2017).

Yet, even if such a desire of a declarative kind has institutional flair, it is not an axiom, a postulate regulating people's actions, it is a generative ethic imperative (of liberation). It is not a device for maintaining and justifying an existing order, it is for changing it so that it will enable the expression of desires of people and open the possibilities of their attainment. A system based on axiomatics is by definition a closed one, the one based on ethical imperatives is open—to imagination, invention and surprise.

The commitment of those who are to lead the transformation—be they a keyworker, team leader, leadership of an institution or leaders of the reform on the national or supranational level—is to the ethical imperative of non-restraint, enabling and self-determination. The leaders of the transition to community care are to be confirmed champions of deinstitutionalisation (European Expert Group on the Transition from Institutional to Community-based Care, 2012).

The responsibility of leaders is great and multifaceted. On one hand, their responsibility is precisely to the quoted imperatives, on the other hand, the responsibility is to maximise, permit, even instigate creativity, freedom and initiative of everybody involved. In other words, the leader needs to allow, even stimulate polyvocality, multiplicity of meaning, initiatives and response. But they must insist on bestowing the criterion of users' emancipation, of their rights, as a main measure of success. The responsibility of a leader is not to charge others with responsibility, to issue orders, delegate tasks, etc.; but to trust co-workers, instigate their initiative, allow them to lead various processes, phases, teams, etc. In doing that, the leader's role is one of a "midwife", of enabling. However, they must react energetically to those acts of helpers, which are, even under the pretence of liberation, independence and transition to the community, setting the way of axioms that need to be superseded.

The knots of responsibility in the post-institutional practice are not, it seems, much less complicated than Kafkian blunders of the institutional system. The difference is that in the transition to the community, they are being slowly unknit, eased, while in the institutional frame each move makes them tighter. However, the notion of responsibility in the transition transmutes to the degree that it is questionable whether we refer to responsibility in the original sense of the word. We will respond affirmatively, when we will be restoring users' responsibility for their own acts—this we will even applaud. We will applaud also when the "responsibility" will migrate, when its relations will be becoming more horizontal and when it will be a response to an actual life situation, distress and trouble of a fellow human being, and not a response to general demands, usually derived from the axiomatics of power. To distinguish between one and the other probably greater precision of designation would be needed. For the responsibility to oneself and the close ones it might be more convenient to use terms like: responsiveness, tactfulness, thoughtfulness, courtesy, politeness, respect—on the level of the interaction order, or plainly *solidarity* (mutual and universal responsibility to each other, because we are all in the same boat). For the responsibility to the superordinated we might prefer such terms as duty, obligation, task, commission or even command in the registry of formal organisations, on the level of interaction then: humility, obedience and domination, arrogance, etc.

Rules that introduce new kinds of responsibility need to be used to facilitate contacts, encounters and joint work, they must serve this, they need to be accessories for living together and not its fetish. Maybe all of you will not agree that an empty street has to be crossed in spite of the red pedestrian light, but most probably you will all agree that it is stupid, when there is no traffic, to wait for the green light (Flaker, 2019).

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